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Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation

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  • Paul Milgrom
  • Ilya Segal

Abstract

We study the class of multiround, multiproduct clock procurement auctions that reduce offered prices at each round. When prices stop declining, the remaining bidders become the winning sellers. For single-minded bidders, each such auction has five properties not shared by Vickrey auctions: each is obviously strategy-proof and group-strategy-proof, sets prices that are Nash equilibrium winning bids in the related first-price auction, preserves winner privacy about values, and can be extended to satisfy a budget constraint. In simulations of the US incentive auction, a heuristic clock auction from this class achieves quick computations, high efficiency, and low prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2020. "Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(1), pages 1-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704074
    DOI: 10.1086/704074
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    Cited by:

    1. Felipe Arteaga & Adam J Kapor & Christopher A Neilson & Seth D Zimmerman, 2022. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1791-1848.
    2. Justus Haucap, 2020. "Nobelpreis für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen [Nobel Prize for Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom: Two Economists who Created Real Markets]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100(12), pages 969-975, December.
    3. Hai Nguyen & Thành Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym, 2021. "Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7438-7454, December.
    4. Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Neil Newman & Ilya Segal, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    6. Billy A. Ferguson & Paul Milgrom, 2024. "Market Design for Surface Water," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Fanqi Shi & Yiqing Xing, 2022. "Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 703-732, December.
    8. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-15.
    9. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
    10. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    11. Ryuji Sano, 2021. "Dynamic communication mechanism design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 163-180, July.
    12. van Basshuysen, Philippe, 2023. "Markets, market algorithms, and algorithmic bias," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115694, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
    14. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
    15. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer & Thibaud Vergé, 2021. "Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration," CESifo Working Paper Series 8971, CESifo.
    16. Deng, Shanglyu, 2023. "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    17. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2021. "Contextually Private Mechanisms," Papers 2112.10812, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    18. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    19. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
    20. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    21. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    22. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2023. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 68-90.
    23. Christopher Neilson & Felipe Arteaga & Adam Kapor & Seth Zimmerman, 2021. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School ChoiceSmart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," Working Papers 650, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..

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