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Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information

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Battigalli, Pierpaolo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-38
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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:57:y:2003:i:1:p:1-38

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  1. José Penalva & Michael D. Ryall, 2001. "Causal Assessment in Finite Extensive-form Games," Economics Working Papers 483, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jose Penalva-Zuasti & Michael D. Ryall, 2003. "Causal Assessment in Finite-length Extensive-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000074, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  5. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1991. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 933, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
  8. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors," ESE Discussion Papers 77, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 048, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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