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Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory

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Author Info
Pierpaolo Battigali
Giacomo Bonanno

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Abstract

We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/98-14.pdf
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Paper provided by California Davis - Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics with number 98-14.

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Handle: RePEc:fth:caldec:98-14

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Postal: University of California Davis - Department of Economics. One Shields Ave., California 95616-8578
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  1. Oliver Board, 2002. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Papers 244, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Partnerships," Working Papers 2006-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Licun Xue, . "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ludovic RENOU, 2003. "Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model," Economics Working Papers ECO2003/21, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Oliver Board, 2002. "Dynamic Interactive Epistemology," Economics Series Working Papers 125, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Eduardo Zambrano, 2004. "Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1020-1020. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-16.

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