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Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory

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  • Pierpaolo Battigali
  • Giacomo Bonanno

Abstract

We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by California Davis - Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics with number 98-14.

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Handle: RePEc:fth:caldec:98-14

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Postal: University of California Davis - Department of Economics. One Shields Ave., California 95616-8578
Phone: (530) 752-0741
Fax: (530) 752-9382
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/
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  1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1997. "The Logic of Belief Persistence," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(01), pages 39-59, April.
  2. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  3. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  4. Lismont, Luc & Mongin, Philippe, 1995. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 127-153, October.
  5. Battigalli, P. & Bonanno, G., 1993. "Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games," Papers 93-11, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, 1999. "An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability," Working Papers 1999.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July.
  8. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
  9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  10. Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995. "A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46, January.
  12. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 247-273, September.
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