Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Contents:

Author Info

  • J. Watson
  • P. Battigalli

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4582.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 582.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 09 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:582

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Cripps,Martin & Scmidt,Klaus & Thomas,Jonathan, 1993. "Reputation in pertubed repeated games," Discussion Paper Serie A 410, University of Bonn, Germany.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sandroni, Alvaro, 2000. "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 157-182, August.
  2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
  3. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers, David K. Levine 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  4. Colin Camerer & Teck H Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong & Keith Weigelt, 2003. "Strategic teaching and equilibrium models of repeated trust and entry games," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
  6. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
  7. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:582. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.