On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 582.
Date of creation: 09 Dec 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Joel Watson, 1997. "On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 369-374, March.
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
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- Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006.
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- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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