On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 65 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Other versions of this item:
- J. Watson & P. Battigalli, 2010. "On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 582, David K. Levine.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cripps,Martin & Scmidt,Klaus & Thomas,Jonathan, 1993.
"Reputation in pertubed repeated games,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
410, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Colin Camerer & Teck H Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong & Keith Weigelt, 2003. "Strategic teaching and equilibrium models of repeated trust and entry games," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Sandroni, Alvaro, 2000. "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 157-182, August.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006.
"Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
- P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002.
"Rationalization and Incomplete Information,"
Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers
9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
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