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Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria

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  • Hausken, Kjell

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 138-144

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:138-144

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
  4. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1993. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Munich Reprints in Economics 3395, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 355-372, May.
  6. Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
  7. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  8. Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in perturbed repeated games," Munich Reprints in Economics 20052, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 561-79, July.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
  12. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  13. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
  14. Hausken, Kjell, 2005. "The battle of the sexes when the future is important," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 89-93, April.
  15. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  16. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July.
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