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Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence

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  • Paul Milgrom
  • John Roberts

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/milrob.pdf
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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 1460.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:1460

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
  2. Yamey, B S, 1972. "Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 129-42, April.
  3. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  4. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  5. Paul Milgrom, 1979. "An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 393R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  7. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
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  1. Game Theory Tuesdays: Why first-born children do better in school (and what monopolists and parents have in common)
    by Presh Talwalkar in Mind Your Decisions on 2013-10-29 04:00:51
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