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Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets

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  • Sexton, Richard J.
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    Abstract

    This paper is a survey on noncooperative game theory relevant to agricultural markets. It is divided into two parts. Part I discussed types of noncooperative games and reviews important developments in noncooperative game theory solution concepts, including Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Strengths and weaknesses of game theory as a modelling tool are also assessed. Part II illustrates applications of the theory to agricultural markets. Game theory is relevant when markets are imperfectly competitive, and this paper argues that this condition is commonly met in agriculture. Specific topics of application include principal-agent models, vertical control, auctions, and bargaining. A shortened version of this paper was published in the Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center in its series Research Reports with number 25183.

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    Date of creation: 1993
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:uconnr:25183

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    Keywords: Industrial Organization; Marketing; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies;

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    5. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347.
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    7. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    8. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    9. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1985. "Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 269-281, Summer.
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    18. Schroeter, John R. & Azzam, Azzeddine M., 1990. "Measuring Market Power in Multi-Product Oligopolies: The U.S. Meat Industry," Staff General Research Papers 11112, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    19. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    21. Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Multiple-Object Auctions," Discussion Papers 496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    23. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
    24. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Prasertsri, Peerapon & Kilmer, Richard L., 2008. "The Bargaining Strength of a Milk Marketing Cooperative," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 37(2), October.

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