Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters
AbstractConflict and war are typically viewed as the outcome of misperceptions, incomplete information, or even irrationality. We show that it can otherwise. Despite the short-run incentives to settle disputes peacefully , there can be long-term, compounding rewards to going to war when doing better relative to one's opponent today implies doing better tomorrow.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 563824000000000011.
Date of creation: 27 Oct 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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