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Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters

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Author Info
Garfinkel, M.R.
Skaperdas, S.

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Abstract

Conflict and war are typically viewed as the outcome of misperceptions, incomplete information, or even irrationality. We show that it can otherwise. Despite the short-run incentives to settle disputes peacefully , there can be long-term, compounding rewards to going to war when doing better relative to one's opponent today implies doing better tomorrow.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 99-00-11.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-11

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; SOCIAL CHOICE;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 355-372, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002376, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl, 1998. "Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 264, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 50-68, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 480-94, July.
  6. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1991. "Conflict and Attitudes toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 116-20, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-17, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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