We examine the effect of insecure property and its accompanying enforcement costs on the efficiency of exchange. Because of the large enforcement costs that may be induced by the expectation of exchange, limited settlement without exchange may be "ex ante" superior for an adversary or even Pareto dominant. We therefore show how the removal of restrictions on exchange and the development of secure property are related. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002
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Volume (Year): 112 (2002) Issue (Month): 476 (January) Pages: 133-146 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1999.
"The Tyranny of Inequality,"
CRSP working papers
423, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 1997.
"Trade and Security,I: Anarchy,"
NBER Working Papers
6223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
Working Papers
050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
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Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2006.
"Globalization and Domestic Conflict,"
Working Papers
050601, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
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