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Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics

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Author Info
Garfinkel, M.R.
Skaperdas, S.

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Abstract

The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, according as the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by his actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war, the second, contract.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 99-00-12.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: WAR ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; MOTIVATION;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Charles Anderton, 2003. "Economic Theorizing Of Conflict: Historical Contributions, Future Possibilities," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 209-222, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0471, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Castillo, Ramon & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2003. "All in the Family or Public? Law and Appropriative Costs as Determinants of Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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