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Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics

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Author Info

  • Garfinkel, M.R.
  • Skaperdas, S.

Abstract

The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, according as the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by his actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war, the second, contract.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 99-00-12.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-12

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: WAR ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; MOTIVATION;

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Cited by:
  1. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players," Economics Discussion Papers 512, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  2. Tony Addison & S Mansoob Murshed, 2010. "From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract," Working Papers id:3206, eSocialSciences.
  3. Ramon Castillo & Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "All in the Family or Public? Law and Appropriative Costs as Determinants of Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series 921, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Anderton, Charles H. & Carter, John R., 2008. "Vulnerable trade: The dark side of an Edgeworth box," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 422-432, November.
  5. Charles Wilber, 2004. "Ethics, human behavior and the methodology of social economics," Forum for Social Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 19-50, March.
  6. Charles Anderton, 2003. "Economic theorizing of conflict: Historical contributions, future possibilities," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 209-222.
  7. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Yuji Tamura, 2010. "A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 3060, CESifo Group Munich.

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