Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics
AbstractThe first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, according as the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by his actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war, the second, contract.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 99-00-12.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
WAR ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; MOTIVATION;
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