A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning
AbstractIn this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 481.
Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Conflict management; international sanctions; arms embargo; international political market; pressure groups;
Other versions of this item:
- Garoupa, Nuno R & Gata, Joao E, 2002. " A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 41-65, January.
- Nuno R. Garoupa & João E. Gata, 2000. "A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning," Working Papers 2000/11, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon..
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
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- Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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