Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge

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Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge

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Borgers Tilman

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Tilman Borgers

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 64 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 265-276
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:1:p:265-276

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Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V.J., 1997. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," Discussion Paper 3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Admissibility and common belief," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
Robin Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2005. "Common reasoning in games: a resolution of the paradoxes of ‘common knowledge of rationality’," Discussion Papers 2005-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolotionary Dynamics," ELSE working papers 057, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 1997. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 221, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 6-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination Of Weakly Dominated Strategies And Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 6-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and common knowledge," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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