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Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance

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Author Info
Leslie McFarland-Marx
Jeroen M. Swinkels

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Abstract

In general, the result of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on order. We find a condition, satisfied by the normal form of any generic extensive form, and by some important games which do not admit generic extensive forms, under which any two games resulting from the elimination of weakly dominated strategies (subject to no more eliminations being possible) are equivalent. We also extend our condition and result to the case of elimination by mixed strategies. The result strengthens the intuitive connection between backward induction and weak dominance. And, under our condition, some computational problems relating to weak dominance, which are gnerally complex, become simple.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1040.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1040.

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Date of creation: Apr 1993
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1040

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  1. Patrick Hummel, 2008. "Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 257-269, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yi-Chun Chen & Ngo Van Long & Xiao Luo, 2007. "Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-03, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Licun Xue, . "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  4. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hummel, Patrick, 2005. "Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting," Working Papers 1236, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Lars Peter Østerdal, 2003. "Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance," Discussion Papers 03-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Stegeman, Mark, 1999. "When Order matters for Iterated Strict Dominance," Research Papers in Economics 1999:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
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