Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
AbstractWe concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between different nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossyness is equivalent to convex range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossy are equivalent to strict Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariant guarantee convexity of the range.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 32 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2007. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 325, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2008. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 2008-7, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004.
122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
- Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1987. "On constant maskin monotonic social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 382-386, August.
- Mutuswami, Suresh, 2005. "Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-88, October.
- Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
- Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
- Takamiya, Koji, 2007. "Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 348-354, June.
- Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995.
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
- Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2007.
"Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 307-325, August.
- Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2006. "Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments," ISER Discussion Paper 0669, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043, Maastricht University.
- David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, 06.
- Stephen Ching, 1998. "Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters"," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 473-490.
- Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2013.
"The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 41-63, January.
- Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2010. "The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993.
"Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
- Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2009. "The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 256-264, September.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Bochet, Olivier & Klaus, Bettina, 2007. "A Note on Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin's (1979) Domain Richness Condition," Research Memoranda 041, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
- Berga, Dolors, 1998. "Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 105-120, March.
- Ritz, Zvi, 1985. "Restricted domains, arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Bossert W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013.
030, Maastricht : GSBE, Graduate School of Business and Economics.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2013. "An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 300-308.
- John Weymark, 2011.
"A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences,"
Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 529-550, December.
- John A. Weymark, 2011. "A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1101, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2010.
"The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
10.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2013. "The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 41-63, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.