Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
AbstractThis paper examines the logical relationship among Maskin monotonicity, independent person-by-person monotonicity, independent weak monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and coalitional strategy-proofness in a society with infinite individuals.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 110 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Infinite individuals Maskin monotonicity Strategy-proofness;
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