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A crash course in implementation theory

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  • Matthew O. Jackson

    ()
    (Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA)

Abstract

This paper is meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 655-708

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:655-708

Note: Received: 26 March 2001/Accepted: 21 May 2001
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References

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  116. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1997. "Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 205-213, November.
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