Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Eric Bahel, 2024. "Anonymous and Strategy-Proof Voting under Subjective Expected Utility Preferences," Papers 2401.04060, arXiv.org.
- Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Kohei Shiozawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms for Public Decision with Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0964, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998.
"Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 272-291, November.
- Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 358.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Masso, J. & Barbera, S., 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 156, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
- Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009.
"Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 275-298, February.
- Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2007. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 325, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2008. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 2008-7, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2016.
"Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(4), pages 1073-1099, April.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2015. "Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies," Working Papers 801, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Özgür Kıbrıs & İpek Tapkı, 2014. "A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(3), pages 163-189, September.
- Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
- Ohseto, Shinji, 2000. "Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-66, July.
- Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018.
"Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
- Kleiner, Andreas & Drexl, Moritz, 2013. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Joseph Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 2012.
"No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 697-719, October.
- Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 2010. "No Externalities: A Characterization of Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility with Public Goods," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 769, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2009.
"Cooperative production and efficiency,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 143-154, March.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Efficiency," Working Papers 305, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 696.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2007. "Cooperative production and efficiency," UC3M Working papers. Economics we070502, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006.
"Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 305-331, April.
- Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation," ISER Discussion Paper 0629, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Salvador Barberà, 2010.
"Strategy-proof social choice,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Diego Moreno & María Moscoso, 2013.
"Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 315-336, January.
- Moreno, Diego, 1994. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods," UC3M Working papers. Economics 2917, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Moreno, Diego & Moscoso, María José, 2010. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1027, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021.
"On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 431-468, August.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2018. "On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2018, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Kuzmics, Christoph & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017.
"On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 56-69.
- Christoph Kuzmics & Jan-Henrik Steg, 2016. "On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget," Graz Economics Papers 2016-03, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Kuzmics, Christoph & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2016. "On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 553, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Jin Li & Jingyi Xue, 2013. "Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 597-622, November.
- William Thomson, 2016.
"Non-bossiness,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 665-696, October.
- William Thomson, 2014. "Non-bossiness," RCER Working Papers 586, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Raghavan, Madhav, 2020. "Influence in private-goods allocation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-28.
- Itai Ashlagi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2012. "Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 531-542, March.
- Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
- John A. Weymark, 2008.
"Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, February.
- John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
- Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2013. "No-envy and dominant strategy implementability in non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 557-563.
- Shinji Ohseto, 2010. "Serial Mechanisms For The Provision Of An Excludable Public Good," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 507-516, December.
- Madhav Raghavan, 2018. "Influence in Private-Good Economies," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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