Cooperative Production and Effciency
AbstractWe characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 305.
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Carmen Bevia & Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Economics Working Papers we070502, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 696.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- D29 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Other
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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