Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
AbstractSuppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Luis Corchón & M. Socorro Puy, 2000. "- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
- P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises
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