A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms

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A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms

Author Info

Liqun Liu () (Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA)
Guoqiang Tian () (Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA)

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Guoqiang Tian

Abstract

This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms (balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced Groves mechanisms for a general class of valuation functions. Theorem 2 provides new balance-permitting domains of valuation functions by reducing the problem of solving partial differential equations to the problem of solving a polynomial function. It shows that a balanced Groves mechanism exists if and only if each valuation function in the family under consideration can be obtained by solving a polynomial function with order less than $n-1$, where n is the number of individuals.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 205-218
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:205-218

Note: Received: 5 January 1997 / Accepted: 25 May 1999
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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