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- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology

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Author Info

  • Luis Corchón

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • M. Socorro Puy

    (Universidad de Málaga)

Abstract

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocationsobtained by any continuous sharing rule contains a subselection that is Pareto efficient. We alsopresent a mechanism that implements in Nash equlibrium the Pareto efficient allocationscontained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-03.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2000
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2000-03.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-03

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Related research

Keywords: Efficiency; Implementation; Sharing Rule;

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References

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  1. Schmeidler David & Tauman Yair, 1994. "Incentive-Compatible Cost-Allocation Schemes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 189-207, August.
  2. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Carmen Bevià & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Effciency," Working Papers 305, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Justin Leroux, 2006. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Cahiers de recherche 06-11, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  3. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  4. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2005-05, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  5. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  6. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
  7. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.

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