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- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology

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Author Info
Luis Corchón () (Universidad de Alicante)
M. Socorro Puy (Universidad de Málaga)

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Abstract

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocationsobtained by any continuous sharing rule contains a subselection that is Pareto efficient. We alsopresent a mechanism that implements in Nash equlibrium the Pareto efficient allocationscontained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-03.pdf
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File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2000
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2000-03.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2000
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Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-03

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Keywords: Efficiency Implementation Sharing Rule

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises
H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laffont, J. J. & Moulin, H., 1982. "Introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-3, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2005-05, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  4. Justin Leroux, 2006. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Cahiers de recherche 06-11, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée. [Downloadable!]
  5. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 696.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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