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Cooperative production and efficiency

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  • Carmen Bevia
  • Luis C. Corchon

Abstract

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we070502.

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Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we070502

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  1. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1996. "Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 501-512.
  2. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 1999. "Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 583-595.
  3. Roemer John E. & Silvestre Joaquim, 1993. "The Proportional Solution for Economies with Both Private and Public Ownership," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 426-444, April.
  4. Liqun Liu & Guoqiang Tian, 1999. "A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 205-218.
  5. Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, 1974. "Incentives and Public Inputs," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 29, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Luis Corchón & M. Socorro Puy, 2000. "- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2000-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2003. "Implementation in teams," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 569-581, October.
  8. Ohseto, Shinji, 1997. "Strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 157-183, April.
  9. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  10. Leroux, Jistin, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2004-07, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  11. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  12. Rajat Deb & Shinji Ohseto, 1999. "Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 685-689.
  13. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
  14. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
  15. Fabella, Raul V., 1988. "Natural team sharing and team productivity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 105-110.
  16. Pfingsten, Andreas, 1991. "Surplus-sharing methods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 287-301, June.
  17. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 335-340, December.
  18. Browning, M J, 1983. "Efficient Decentralisation with a Transferable Good," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 375-81, April.
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