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Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*)

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Author Info

  • Shigehiro Serizawa

    (Department of Economics, Shiga University, 1-1-1, Banba, Hikone, Shiga 522, JAPAN)

Abstract

We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfy "strategy-proofness," "individual rationality", "no exploitation" and "non-bossiness". Any such procedure is a scheme of "semi-convex cost sharing" determined by "the minimum demand principle".

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 501-512

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:501-512

Note: Received: June 2, 1993; revised version January 1995
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Cited by:
  1. Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching, 2013. "A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 871-911, March.
  2. Carmen Bevia & Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Economics Working Papers we070502, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  3. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation," ISER Discussion Paper 0629, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  4. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Ohseto, Shinji, 2000. "Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-66, July.
  6. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  7. Diego Moreno & María Moscoso, 2013. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 315-336, January.

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