This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Shigehiro Serizawa

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

"Strategy-proofness" is one of the axioms that are most frequently used in the recent literature on social choice theory. It requires that by misrepresenting his preferences, no agent can manipulate the outcome of the social choice rule in his favor. The stronger requirement of "group strategy-proofness" is also often employed to obtain clear characterization results of social choice rules. Group strategy-proofness requires that no group of agents can manipulate the outcome in their favors. In this paper, we advocate "effective pairwise strategy-proofness." It is the requirement that the social choice rule should be immune to unilateral manipulation and "self-enforcing" pairwise manipulation in the sense that no agent of a pair has the incentive to betray his partner. We apply the axiom of effective pairwise strategy-proofness to three types of economies: public good economy, pure exchange economy, and allotment economy. Although effective pairwise strategy-proofness is seemingly a much weaker axiom than group strategy-proofness, effective pairwise strategy-proofness characterizes social choice rules that are analyzed by using different axioms in the literature.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2005/DP0629.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0629.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0629

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Fax: 81-6-6878-2766
Email:
Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1996. "Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 501-512.
    Other versions:
  3. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
  5. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg, 1999. "Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 381-387. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Musgrave, R.A., 1985. "A brief history of fiscal doctrine," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-59 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Schummer, James, 2000. "Manipulation through Bribes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 180-198, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  2. Vito Fragnelli & Maria Erminia Marina, 2009. "Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(2), pages 143-153, July. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.