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Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies

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  • Ju, Biung-Ghi

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (August)
Pages: 573-592

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:40:y:2004:i:5:p:573-592

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. Postlewaite, Andrew & Wettstein, David, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 603-11, October.
  2. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  3. Chipman, John S., 1974. "Homothetic preferences and aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 26-38, May.
  4. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1979. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," MPRA Paper 8495, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 1981.
  5. Yuqing Zhou, 1997. "A note on continuous social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 245-248.
  6. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November.
  7. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
  9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  10. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
  11. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
  12. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-52, May.
  13. Chipman, John S & Moore, James C, 1973. "Aggregate Demand, Real National Income, and the Compensation Principle," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(1), pages 153-81, February.
  14. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
  15. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
  16. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  17. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1979. "On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 347-351.
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Cited by:
  1. Jin Li & Jingyi Xue, 2013. "Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 597-622, November.
  2. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2005. "Strategy-proof risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-254, February.
  3. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).

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