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Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees

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Author Info
Shigehiro Serizawa () (Faculty of Economics, Tohoku University)
John A. Weymark () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

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Abstract

For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between efficiency and distributional goals in exchange economies if the social choice rule is required to be strategy-proof.

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File URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu02-w16R.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2002
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number 0216.

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Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision: Aug 2002
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0216

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Postal: Box 1819, Station B, Nashville, TN 37235
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Web page: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diana Weymark).

Related research
Keywords: Social choice; strategy-proofness; exchange economics;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mark A. Satterthwaite, 2001. "Strategy-proofness and markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 37-58. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Hurwicz, Leonid & Walker, Mark, 1990. "On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 683-704, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200305, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  3. BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Cahiers de recherche 2006-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Luis Corchón & José Rueda-Llano, 2008. "Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 279-291, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2008. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 457-473, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sasaki, Hiroo, 2003. "Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with Many Commodities," Working Papers 2003-01, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.

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