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Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies

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  • Leroux, Jistin

    (Rice U)

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    Abstract

    In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences.

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    File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2004papers/07leroux.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Rice University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004-07.

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    Date of creation: Apr 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2004-07

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    1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, 08.
    2. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
    3. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 1999. "Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 583-595.
    4. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
    5. Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto, 2002. "Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 659-664.
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    Cited by:
    1. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    2. Carmen Bevià & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Effciency," Working Papers 305, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.

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