Sharing the Cost of Global Warming
AbstractDue to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a "global insurance scheme" to be fincanced according to countries responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions, raher than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 10-186.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.�113, n°4, décembre 2011, p.�758-783.
Other versions of this item:
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Justin Leroux, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," CIRANO Working Papers 2010s-32, CIRANO.
- Etienne BILLETTE de VILLEMEUR & Justin Leroux, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," Cahiers de recherche 10-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Leroux, Justin & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," IDEI Working Papers 629, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Feb 2011.
- Étienne Billette de Villemeur & Justin Leroux, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," Cahiers de recherche 1030, CIRPEE.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-10-02 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-10-02 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-10-02 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 335-340, December.
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- Bossert, Walter, 1995. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, February.
- Bossert W., 1996. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 51-51, February.
- Norman Henderson & Ian Bateman, 1995. "Empirical and public choice evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates and the implications for intergenerational discounting," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(4), pages 413-423, June.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert, 1996. "Redistribution and compensation (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 343-355.
- Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Leroux, Justin, 2013. "Curbing emissions through (efficient) carbon liabilities: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective," MPRA Paper 46953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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