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Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

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  • Moulin, Herve

    (Rice U)

  • Sprumont, Yves

    (Universite de Montreal)

Abstract

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that individual demands are comparable, though perhaps different, commodities, and that agents are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays his/her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker.s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost- sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2002. "Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing," Working Papers 2002-05, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2002-05
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    File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2002papers/05Moulin.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yves Sprumont, 2008. "Nearly serial sharing methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(2), pages 155-184, June.
    2. Trudeau, Christian, 2014. "Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 137-151.
    3. Hervé Moulin & Yves Sprumont, 2007. "Fair allocation of production externalities : recent results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(1), pages 7-36.
    4. David Lowing & Léa Munich & Kevin Techer, 2024. "Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: an axiomatic approach," Working Papers 2024-05, CRESE.
    5. Yves Sprumont, 2010. "An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1711-1748, September.
    6. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2013. "A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 439-460, May.
    7. Trudeau, Christian, 2009. "Cost sharing with multiple technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 695-707, November.
    8. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 1-35, November.
    9. EHLERS, Lars & WESTKAMP, Alexander, 2011. "Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking," Cahiers de recherche 09-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    10. Edward Pearsall, 2009. "The complete incremental cost test for cross-subsidies with a sub-modular cost function," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 274-285, December.
    11. Moulin, Herve & Vohra, Rakesh, 2003. "Characterization of additive cost sharing methods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 399-407, September.
    12. Eric Bahel, 2011. "The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 551-589, August.
    13. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2016. "Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 313-339, February.

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    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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