Minimal rights based solidarity
AbstractIn a model where individuals with different levels of skills exert different levels of effort, we propose to use individuals’ minimal rights to divide an extra amount of income generated by a change in the skill profile. Priority is given to individuals with a positive minimal right. We characterize two families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that implement this solidarity idea. One family guarantees each individual her claim when claims are feasible. The other family guarantees a non-negative income after redistribution for all individuals.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium with number 06/356.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision:
minimal rights; solidarity; compensation; claims;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-05 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Iñigo Iturbe Ormaetxe, 1995.
"Redistribution And Individual Characteristics,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1995-19, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
- Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006.
"Compensation and responsibility,"
- Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978.
"Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
- Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1975. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," Discussion Papers 174, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bossert, Walter, 1995.
"Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, February.
- Bossert W., 1996. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 51-51, February.
- Bossert, W., 1993. "Redistribution Mechanisms Based on Individual Characteristics," Working Papers 9307, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert, 1996. "Redistribution and compensation (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 343-355.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Moulin, Herve, 2001.
"Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing,"
2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
- Maniquet, F., 1996.
"An Equal Right Solution to the Compensation-Responsability Dilemma,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
335.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Maniquet, Francois, 1998. "An equal right solution to the compensation-responsibility dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 185-202, March.
- Fleurbaey Marc, 1995. "Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 505-521, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nathalie Verhaeghe).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.