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On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study

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  • Herrero
  • C.

Abstract

This paper reports an experimental study on three well known solutions for claims problems, that is, the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. To do this, we first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these three rules. Moreover, we also let subjects play an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy profiles in which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects? play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device. We also administered a questionnaire to a different group of students, asking them to act as an impartial arbitrator to solve (among others) the same claims situations played in the lab. Also in this case, the proportional solution was selected by the vast majority of respondents

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 166.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:166

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Keywords: Experimental Economics; Claims problems; Proportional rule;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Veronika Grimm & Jaromir Kovarik & Giovanni Ponti, 2008. "Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 402-422, December.
  2. BOSMANS, Kristof & SCHOKKAERT, Erik, . "Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionnaire study of cuts in earnings and pensions," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2166, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. María Paz Espinosa & Jaromír Kovárík & Giovanni Ponti, 2010. "Strategic Interaction and Conventions," ThE Papers 10/09, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  4. repec:dgr:umamet:2008031 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Jeremiah Hurley & Neil Buckley & Katherine Cuff & Mita Giacomini & David Cameron, 2011. "Judgments regarding the fair division of goods: the impact of verbal versus quantitative descriptions of alternative divisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 341-372, July.
  6. Erik Ansink & Carmen Marchiori, 2009. "Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequent," Working Papers 2009.126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. repec:dgr:uvatin:2004044 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Ansink, Erik, 2011. "The Arctic scramble: Introducing claims in a contest model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 693-707.
  9. Anita Gantner & Kristian Horn & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2013. "Fair Division in Unanimity Bargaining with Subjective Claims," Working Papers 2013-31, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  10. José M. Jiménez Gómez, 2010. "Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Marianne Lefebvre, 2011. "Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources when Self-insurance is Available: an Experiment," Working Papers 11-22, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
  12. William Thomson, 2013. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update," RCER Working Papers 578, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

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