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Non-Manipulable Division Rules in Claim Problems and Generalizations

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Author Info
Biung-Ghi Ju (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)
Eiichi Miyagawa (Department of Economics, Columbia University)
Toyotaka Sakai (Department of Economics, University of Rochester)

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Abstract

This paper studies the problem of allocating divisible resources among agents based on their characteristics. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, which allocates the liquidation value of a bankrupted firm to creditors based on their claims. By allowing agents' characteristics to be multi-dimensional and varying the meaning of variables in the model, our model subsumes a number of existing and new alloca- tion problems, such as the problems of cost sharing, social choice under transferable utilities, income redistribution, bankruptcy with multiple assets, probability updat- ing, and probability aggregation. We characterize allocation rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group. A number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Kansas, Department of Economics in its series WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS with number 200307.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision: Aug 2005
Publication status: Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
Handle: RePEc:kan:wpaper:200307

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Related research
Keywords: Reallocation-proofness; proportional rule; no advantageous reallocation; manipulation via merging or splitting.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The proportional solution for rights problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 231-246, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Networks," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200410, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
  5. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  7. Chambers, Christopher P. & Thomson, William, 2002. "Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 235-252, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  9. Bergantinos, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2004. "Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 87-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Herrero, Carmen & Maschler, Michael & Villar, Antonio, 1999. "Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-77, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-linear Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 49-67, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C., 1986. "Algebraic aggregation theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 63-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 563, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Networks," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200410, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sprumont, Yves, 2004. "Aumann-Shapley Pricing: A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case," Cahiers de recherche 11-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ. [Downloadable!]
  4. JU, Biung-Ghi & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2006. "Progressivity, inequality reduction and merging-proofness in taxation," CORE Discussion Papers 2006075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. William Thomson & Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2006. "Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims," RCER Working Papers 531, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2006. "The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2006076, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  7. SPRUMONT, Yves & MOULIN, Hervé, 2005. "Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results," Cahiers de recherche 2005-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  8. HERRERO, Carmen & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & PONTI, Giovanni, 2006. "On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study," CORE Discussion Papers 2006062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Karagozoglu, Emin, 2008. "A Noncooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with an Endogenous Estate," Research Memoranda 031, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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