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Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution

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  • Herrero, Carmen
  • Maschler, Michael
  • Villar, Antonio

Abstract

The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution to this problem, called the Rights-Egalitarian Solution, is proposed and characterized. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents the difference between the aggregate entitlements and the amount of the good available. A relevant feature of the analysis developed is that no sign restriction is established on the parameters of the model (that is, the aggregate entitlements may exceed or fall short of the amount of the good, agents' rights may be positive or negative, the allocation may involve a redistribution on agents' holding, etc.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 37 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 59-77

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:59-77

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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References

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  1. Chun, Youngsub & Peters, Hans, 1991. "The lexicographic equal-loss solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 151-161, October.
  2. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992. "Bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August.
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  4. Stef Tijs & Gert-Jan Otten, 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-36, December.
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  7. Tijs, S.H. & Otten, G.J.M., 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," Research Memorandum 615, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  8. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  9. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 1989. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521343831, December.
  10. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  11. Tijs, S.H. & Otten, G.J.M., 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154196, Tilburg University.
  12. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 103-106.
  13. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
  14. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers 10571, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  15. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The proportional solution for rights problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 231-246, June.
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