The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems
AbstractThis paper provides a comparative analysis of some classical solutions to bankruptcy problems from an axiomatic viewpoint. These rules are the constrained equal-awards rule, the constrained equal-losses rule, the proportional rule and the Talmud rule. The purpose of this study is to facilitate the understanding of their differences and to clarify the type of situations in which each of these rules is better.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Antonio Villar Notario & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 2000. "The Three Musketeers: Four Classical Solutions To Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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