The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach
AbstractWe associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 26 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Economic theory and game theory 001, Nir Dagan.
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers 10571, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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