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Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

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Author Info

  • William Thomson

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? A group of agents decide to undertake a public project that they can jointly afford. How much should each of them contribute? This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems.

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_578.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 578.

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Length: 64 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:578

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: claims problems; constrained equal awards rule; constrained equal losses rule; proportional rule; axiomatic approach; game-theoretic approach;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Thomson, William, 2013. "A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 157-168.

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