The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof
AbstractWe consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. A rule to solve such problems is consistent if the choice it makes for each problem is always in agreement with the choice it makes for each "reduced problem" obtained by imagining that some claimants leave with their awards and reassessing the situation a that point. It says that each remaining claimant should receive what he received initially. We consider the version of the proportional rule that selects for each problem, the awards vector that is proportional to the vector of claims truncated at the amount to divide. We illustrate a geometric technique developed by Thomson (2001) by showing that the two-claimant truncated proportional rule has no consistent extension to general populations (Dagan and Volij, 1997).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 529.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
Conflicting claims; Division rules; Consistency; Consistent extension; Claims-truncated proportional rule.;
Other versions of this item:
- Thomson, William, 2008. "The two-agent claims-truncated proportional rule has no consistent extension: A constructive proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 59-65, January.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-06 (All new papers)
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