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On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study

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Author Info

  • Carmen Herrero

    ()
    (U. de Alicante e IVIE)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    ()
    (U. de Málaga, Universidad Pablo de Olavide y CORE, Universit´e catholique de Louvain)

  • Giovanni Ponti

    ()
    (U. de Alicante y Università di Ferrara)

Abstract

This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating conflicting claims: the constrained equal awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these three rules. In addition, we let subjects play an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy profiles in which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects’ play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device, especially when we frame the game as an hypothetical bankruptcy situation. We also administered a questionnaire to a different group of students, asking them to act as impartial arbitrators to solve (among others) the same problems played in the lab. Also in this case, respondents were sensitive to the framing of the questions, but the proportional rule was selected by the vast majority of respondents.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 09.10.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:09.10

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Keywords: Claims problems; Proportional rule; Experimental Economics;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kristof Bosmans & Erik Schokkaert, 2009. "Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionnaire study of cuts in earnings and pensions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 533-557, November.
  2. GRIMM, Veronika & KOVARIK, Jaromir & PONTI, Giovanni, 2005. "Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2005039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. William Thomson, 2013. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 578, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  4. Anita Gantner & Kristian Horn & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2013. "Fair Division in Unanimity Bargaining with Subjective Claims," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck 2013-31, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  5. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, 2004. "Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 04-044/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. Marianne Lefebvre, 2011. "Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources when Self-insurance is Available: an Experiment," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 11-22, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
  7. Erik Ansink & Carmen Marchiori, 2009. "Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequent," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2009.126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Kovarik, Jaromir & Ponti, Giovanni, 2010. "Strategic Interaction and Conventions," DFAEII Working Papers 2010-07, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  9. José M. Jiménez Gómez, 2010. "Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2010-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  10. Ansink, Erik, 2011. "The Arctic scramble: Introducing claims in a contest model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 693-707.
  11. Jeremiah Hurley & Neil Buckley & Katherine Cuff & Mita Giacomini & David Cameron, 2011. "Judgments regarding the fair division of goods: the impact of verbal versus quantitative descriptions of alternative divisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 341-372, July.

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