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Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence

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Author Info
Orley Ashenfelter
David E. Bloom

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Abstract

This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration. Simple models of arbitrator behavior are developed under each of these alternative mechanisms. These models are estimated and tested using data on the outcomes of both forms of arbitrationin New Jersey, a state in which arbitration is mandatory for unresolved pay disputes involving police officer unions and public employers. The major findings are (1) that the high proportion of union victories under final-offer arbitration were generated by a set of impartial arbitrators applying the same standards used in conventional arbitration, and (2) that union bargainers appear to be considerably more risk averse than employer bargainers, with the wage increases under final-offer arbitration having a lower mean and a lower variance than under conventional arbitration.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1149.

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Date of creation: Jun 1983
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1149

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. David Card, 1983. "Arbitrators as Lie Detectors," Working Papers 552, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  2. repec:fth:prinin:163 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Henry S. Farber, 1981. "Splitting-the-difference in interest arbitration," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 35(1), pages 70-77, October.
  5. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1983. "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 543, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David Dickinson, 2005. "Mediation, Walrasian Tatonement, and Negotiations as an Exchange Economy," Working Papers 05-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Clara Ponsati & Adamuz & Mercedes, 2004. "Arbitration Systems and Negotiations," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 118, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1983. "Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important?," NBER Working Papers 1183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Nejat Anbarci, 2005. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Working Papers 0518, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robert Gibbons, 1989. "Learning In Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 2547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1993. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," NBER Working Papers 4447, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Herrero & C., 2004. "On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 166, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2005. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 11189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Juan Pablo Montero, 2004. "A model of arbitration in regulation," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 219, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," NBER Working Papers 3417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," NBER Working Papers 12202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1984. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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