Mediation, Walrasian Tatonement, and Negotiations as an Exchange Economy
AbstractAlternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, such as mediation and arbitration, are becoming increasingly used to help resolve disputes in a variety of arenas. Among ADR procedures, mediation is the most utilized yet least analyzed procedure. This article examines negotiations and dispute resolution using the tools of general equilibrium theory. Specifically, mediators function as the Walrasian auctioneers of exchange theory by altering trade-off rates among bargaining issues. In this way, mediators facilitate a process leading towards voluntary settlement. This idea of Walrasian mediation is supported by the literature on mediation and mediator techniques, and so this insight opens up mediation to much more rigorous economic analysis. Among the implications of this approach are: 1) successful mediation leads to Pareto efficient settlements; 2) non-neutral mediators—those with a stake in the outcome—can guide negotiators towards preferred outcomes by introducing resources into mediation; 3) mediation Pareto dominates arbitration for resolving disputes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 05-05.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Thelma C. Raley Hall, Boone, North Carolina 28608
Web page: http://www.business.appstate.edu/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- David Dickinson, 2003. "Mediation, Walrasian Tâtonnement, and Negotiations as an Exchange Economy," Working Papers 2003-11, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-06-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, 1983. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elaine Meichen Liu, 2008. "Time to Change What to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology Adoption Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China," Working Papers 526.pdf, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Henry S. Farber, 1981. "Splitting-the-difference in interest arbitration," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(1), pages 70-77, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (O. Ashton Morgan).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.