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Arbitrator Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Orley Ashenfelter

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

Arbitration systems are often used to resolve labor disputes because on-going employment relationships are likely to contain specific (human capital) investments. Recent research indicates that the ex ante acceptability of arbitration to the parties must depend, in part, on the unpredictability of the arbitrator's award. It is shown that the usual selection process for arbitrators does imply that arbitrator decisions should be statistically exchangeable (in the limit), and the evidence available to date supports this hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Orley Ashenfelter, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," Working Papers 599, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:219
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce L. Benson, 1999. "Polycentric Law Versus Monopolized Law : Implications from International Trade for the Potential Success of Emerging Markets," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 15(Fall 1999), pages 36-66.
    2. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, March.
    3. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2003. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 857, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    4. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2022. "Discovery in a screening model of final offer arbitration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Mark L. Egan & Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, 2018. "Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers," NBER Working Papers 25150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Julian Donaubauer & Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2018. "Winning or losing in investor‐to‐state dispute resolution: The role of arbitrator bias and experience," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 892-916, September.
    7. James Lambrinos & Thomas D. Ashman, 2007. "Salary Determination in the National Hockey League Is Arbitration Efficient?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(2), pages 192-201, May.
    8. Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert, 2013. "Freedom to bargain and disputes’ resolution," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 373-388, October.
    9. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1998. "Reinterpreting Arbitration's Narcotic Effect: An Experimental Study of Learning in Repeated Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-33, October.
    10. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(3), pages 783-821.
    11. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom & Gordon B. Dahl, 2013. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(3), pages 399-423, September.
    12. David Dickinson, 2003. "Mediation, Walrasian Tâtonnement, and Negotiations as an Exchange Economy," Working Papers 2003-11, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Dickinson, David L., 2006. "The chilling effect of optimism: The case of final-offer arbitration," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-30, February.
    14. Daniel R. Marburger & Paul L. Burgess, 2004. "Can Prior Offers and Arbitration Outcomes Be Used to Predict the Winners of Subsequent Final‐Offer Arbitration Cases?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(1), pages 93-102, July.
    15. Janet Currie, 1991. "Rules, Coordination and Manipulability Among Arbitrators," NBER Working Papers 3821, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Gershoni, Naomi, 2021. "Individual vs. group decision-making: Evidence from a natural experiment in arbitration proceedings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    17. Mark D. Gough & Alexander J. S. Colvin, 2020. "Decision-Maker and Context Effects in Employment Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(2), pages 479-497, March.
    18. Nejat Anbarci & Kang Rong & Jaideep Roy, 2019. "Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 21-52, July.
    19. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. David J. Faurot, 2001. "Equilibrium Explanation of Bargaining and Arbitration in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(1), pages 22-34, February.
    21. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2020. "Judicial arbitration of unfair dismissal cases: The role of peer effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    22. María Mercedes Adamuz & Clara Ponsatí, 2009. "Arbitration systems and negotiations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 279-303, September.
    23. Wojciech Olszewski, 2011. "A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 174-213, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    arbitration;

    JEL classification:

    • D59 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Other

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