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Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

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Author Info
Orley Ashenfelter
David Bloom

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to explore the possibility that the costs and benefits of legal representation are structured so that each individual party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility .of being exploited. The first part of the paper shows how the structure of the incentives faced by the parties may be estimated, and the second describes the results of empirical tests in several different settings. The empirical results strongly suggest that the parties do face "prisoner's dilemma" incentives, although no attempt is made to determine whether the parties respond to these interviews.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4447.

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Date of creation: Sep 1993
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4447

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 342-46, May.
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  2. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, 1983. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, 1987. "The impact of attorneys and arbitrators on arbitration awards," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 40(4), pages 543-555, July.
  4. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1503-28, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David E. Bloom, 1986. "Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. repec:fth:prinin:219 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 819-44, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 157-172, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Henry S. Farber & J. Michelle White, 1993. "A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice," Working Papers 693, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  2. Henry S. Farber & Michael J. White, 1993. "A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice," NBER Working Papers 4371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dr Ronald W. McQuaid, 1994. "Partnerships And Urban Economic Development," Working Paper p13, Departement of Economics, Napier University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, 1996. "The Legal Battle," UCLA Economics Working Papers 749, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Martin Halla, 2007. "Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers," Economics working papers 2007-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jean Olson Lanjouw, 1993. "Patent Protection: Of What Value and for How Long?," NBER Working Papers 4475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. IOSSA, Elisabetta & JULLIEN, Bruno, 2007. "The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services," IDEI Working Papers 485, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, 1999. "Truth and the Legal Battle," UCLA Economics Working Papers 790, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. repec:fth:prinin:314 is not listed on IDEAS
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