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Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation

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Author Info
Dana, James D, Jr
Spier, Kathryn E

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 9 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 349-67
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:349-67

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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/

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  1. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385. [Downloadable!]
  2. repec:bep:dewple:2003-1-1056 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, 2000. "The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission," NBER Working Papers 7726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, 1996. "The Legal Battle," UCLA Economics Working Papers 749, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, 1999. "Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney profits," Working Papers 99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  8. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  10. Péter Eso & Balázs Szentes, 2004. "The Price of Advice," Discussion Papers 1416, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Douglas Cumming, 2001. "Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 249-280, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. James D. Dana & Kathryn Spier, 2000. "Revenue Sharing, Demand Uncertainty, and Vertical Control of Competing Firms," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1511, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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