Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration
AbstractAnalysis of a new set of data indicates that conventional arbi trators tend to mechanically compromise between the parties' final offers with v irtually no evidence of systematic reference to the facts of the cases. However, since there is a substantial amount of unexplained variance in the arbitrators' decisions, this evidence of mechanical compromise behavior should be viewed as characterizing theoverall operation of conventional arbitration mechanisms and not the behavior of individual arbitrators in any particular case. Indeed, the r esults are consistent with the view that individual arbitratorspay close attent ion to the facts of the cases, but that there is considerable variation in the s tructure of different arbitrators' preference functions. Copyright 1986 by MIT Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.
Volume (Year): 68 (1986)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Other versions of this item:
- David E. Bloom, 1986. "Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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