An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbitration Systems
AbstractThis paper reports the results of a systematic experimental comparison of the effect of alternative arbitration systems on dispute rates. The three main findings indicate that (1) dispute rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes; (2) the dispute rate in a final-offer arbitration system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional arbitration system; and (3) dispute rates are inversely related to the uncertainty costs of disputes, indicating that some bargainers behave as if they were risk averse. Coauthors are Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber, and Matthew Spiegel. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper in its series Papers with number 55.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON NEW-JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
bargaining ; arbitration;
Other versions of this item:
- Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-33, November.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbritation Systems," Working papers 562, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," NBER Working Papers 3417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
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- Currie, J. & Mcconnell, S., 1989.
"Strikes And Arbitration In The Public Sector: Can Legislation Reduce Dispute Costs?,"
9, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
- Currie, J. & Mcconnell, S., 1989. "Strikes And Arbitration In The Public Sector: Can Legislation Reduce Dispute Costs?," Papers 360, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
- McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-15, September.
- David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanagh, 1986.
"An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators,"
NBER Working Papers
1938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Henry S. Farber & Harry C. Katz, 1979. "Interest arbitration, outcomes, and the incentive to bargain," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(1), pages 55-63, October.
- Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-36, June.
- Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, 1983. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harrison, Glenn W, 1989. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 749-62, September.
- Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 99-120, February.
- Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1985. "Arbitrator decision making: When are final offers important?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(1), pages 76-89, October.
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