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An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

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Author Info
Bloom, David E
Cavanagh, Christopher L

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Abstract

This paper analyzes alternative mechanisms for the selection of arbitrators. The authors review key institutional features of the threemost prevalent mechanisms for selecting arbitrators: rank/veto, alternate strike, and rotating panel. They present a more formal analysis in which these mechanisms are treated as economic games, andanalyze the alternative mechanisms in terms of the incentives they provide for strategic behavior and the efficiency of any equilibrium strategies that exist. Some implications of varying selected parametersof each mechanism are derived and the general role of arbitrator selection mechanisms in the process of bargaining under the threat ofarbitration are considered. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 76 (1986)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 408-22
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:76:y:1986:i:3:p:408-22

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  1. repec:fth:prinin:267 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Stephen Donald & Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2004. "What is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association," NBER Working Papers 10684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Justin Zhang & Tian Zhu, 2000. "Verifiability, Incomplete Contracts and Dispute Resolution," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 281-290, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Elisabetta Iossa & Giuliana Palumbo, 2006. "Reputational Concerns and Bias in Arbitration," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 06-09, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Working Papers 647, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2005. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 11189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. repec:fth:prinin:284 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. repec:fth:prinin:260 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie, 1990. "Negotiator Behavior and the Occurrence of Disputes," Working Papers 640, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Janet Currie, 1991. "Rules, Coordination and Manipulability Among Arbitrators," NBER Working Papers 3821, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Nejat Anbarci, 2005. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Working Papers 0518, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1984. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gregory Dell'Omo & Craig A. Olson, 1991. "A Comparison of Interest Arbitrator Decision -Making in Experimental and Field Settings," Working Papers 664, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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