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Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?

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  • Alon Klement
  • Zvika Neeman

Abstract

This paper examines how providing litigants with information about arbitrators' win/loss ratios affects arbitrators' incentives in deciding the cases before them in an impartial and unbiased manner. We show that if litigants are informed about arbitrators' past decisions, then arbitrators might want to make an incorrect decision when a correct decision would raise the suspicion that they are biased. Therefore, providing information about arbitrators' past decisions might create adverse incentive effects and reduce the accuracy of arbitration. We compare the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions under different arbitrator selection procedures and discuss the implications for the design of arbitration rules by arbitration and dispute resolution providers and by court-administered arbitration programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2013. "Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 369-397.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/669717
    DOI: 10.1086/669717
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2012. "Bargaining and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 116-132, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alma Cohen & Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2015. "Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 133-159.
    2. Rao, Weijia, 2021. "Are arbitrators biased in ICSID arbitration? A dynamic perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    3. Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 415-445, June.
    4. Gershoni, Naomi, 2021. "Individual vs. group decision-making: Evidence from a natural experiment in arbitration proceedings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

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