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Antidumping Law as a Collusive Device

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Author Info
Maurizio Zanardi () (Boston College)

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Abstract

Empirical evidence for the United States shows that many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before the International Trade Commission and the International Trade Administration complete their investigations. Prusa (1992) argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to threaten and induce foreign industries into a collusive agreement exonerated from antitrust concerns because of US trade laws. In his model, all antidumping petitions should be withdrawn, which is not the case. This paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn and Prusa's result is just a special case. The decision to withdraw a petition depends on two key parameters: the coordination cost and the bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. A new dataset is constructed to test the theoretical model on the US experience for the period 1980-1992. The econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the antidumping law is used as a collusive device.

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File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/WP487.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 487.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:487

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Related research
Keywords: Antidumping; bargaining cost; collusion; coordination cost; withdrawn petitions;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

Cited by:
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  1. Alfonso Mendieta, 2005. "Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried?," Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA, , vol. 0(1), pages 41-69, January-J. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ian Wooton & Maurizio Zanardi, 2002. "Trade and Competition Policy: Anti-Dumping versus Anti-trust," Working Papers 2002_6, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Oct 2002. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bruce A. Blonigen & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 134-154, March. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gasmi, Farid & Malin, Eric & Tandé, François, 2004. "Lobbying in Antidumping," IDEI Working Papers 320, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cláudio Roberto Fóffano Vasconcelos & Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos, 2005. "Medidas Antidumping E Resultados Colusivos: O Caso Do Pebdl Na Economia Brasileira," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 071, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
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